Southern Viet Nam's Criminal Traditions

Copyright (c) 1991 by William L. Cassidy. All rights reserved.

Part One: Down In the Delta

We shall now attempt a brief introduction to the criminal traditions of southern Viet Nam's Mekong Delta region, paying particular attention to the area formerly known as Cochin China. We regret that the self imposed limitations of this paper permit only superficial treatment.

Study of this region's criminal traditions is extremely complex, requires exhausting attention to historical detail, and is subject to widely variable interpretation. Add to this study the symbiotic influence of Vietnamese; Chinese; Chinese-Vietnamese; Japanese; Soviet; French and American secret societies; religious sects; revolutionary movements; paramilitary forces; intelligence services and you have something that requires a lifetime of painful scholarship to appreciate. What the British historian Daniel G.E. Hall claimed for the study of South-East Asian history in general is true for the study of South-East Asian criminal traditions in particular:

"...the apparatus scholasticus required by the researcher...takes a lifetime to acquire, so that the number of workers in the field is extremely limited; and, if that were not enough, the difficulties imposed by the nature of the material, and its lacunae, are often wellnigh insuperable."

Southern Vietnamese criminals, initiates and revolutionaries are true masters of the clandestine and leave us with precious few primary sources upon which to draw. What traces we have of them filter through colonial prejudice and give rather a distorted view. To try and separate historical fact from this cobweb is a daunting task indeed.

Still, we find that it is possible to find a certain continuity by following the ancient expressions of lawlessness to modern times. A second, intertwined approach, is to pay keen attention to the geography of the region, discovering the traditional routes of commerce and rationale of habitat. The casual student may resist this twenty-century backward glance, and to those who do we again cite Hall:

"[L]et it be emphasized as strongly as possible that the early history of the South-East Asian peoples is of special value to the student, and not only because of its intrinsic interest, great and rewarding though it is. It is vital to an understanding of their later history: one neglects it at one's peril."

The Ancient Tradition of Piracy

Funan and Chenla

In about the first century a.d. the early state scholars now refer to as Funan was founded as a result of Indian penetration into the lower Indochinese peninsula.

The true name of this state is unknown. "Funan" is the modern Chinese pronunciation of the characters B'iu nam, the name by which Chinese observers knew the pre Khmer settlements along the Mekong River between Chau Doc and Phnom Penh. B'iu nam is in turn derived from the old Khmer bnam, (mod. phnom) meaning "mountain;" a contraction of the title of the rulers of the region: kurung bnam, or "king of the mountain."

The geographical boundaries of Funan are unclear. It seems that at the height of power, Funan's influence may have covered the entire Mekong Delta, extended up through the Tonle Sap basin and encompassed nearly the whole of Cambodia.

A Chinese mission to Funan in about 250 a.d. noted walled cities containing palaces and homes, populated by ugly, black skinned, frizzy haired people who went naked; of simple manners but "...not given to theft." They had a lively entrepot on the Gulf of Siam, a system of taxation payable in gold, silver, pearls and perfumes, a lettered class keeping books and libraries, and were noted for their skill in silver work.

From the first Chinese mission of 250 until about 260, criminal activity in the region appears to have been limited to sea piracy. Then, in about 270 to 280 a.d., Chinese chronicles record the inland movement of Funanese bandits in confederation with bandits from the state of Lin yi, or Champa, committing raids upon Chinese garrisons.

Funan was a powerful state with a strong fleet that dominated the political and economic affairs of southern Indochina until a Mon Khmer absorption of in the sixth century. According to Chinese sources, in the mid sixth century the state of Funan was overthrown by the rebellion of a feudal state known as Chenla, which thereafter began a consolidation process lasting until about 706 a.d., when Chenla split into two divisions known as the "Land Chenla" and the "Water Chenla," also known as "upper" and "lower" Chenla. The original, or "upper" Chenla is thought to encompass northern Cambodia and southern Laos. The post-706 "lower" Chenla is thought to extend southwards, covering lower Cambodia and the whole of Cochin China.

Yen Li, or Champa

To the east of Funan and later, Chenla, was the ancient coastal state of Champa, known to the Chinese as Lin yi. Lin yi is thought by the Chinese to have been founded circa 192 a.d. by a native official named Ch'u Lien, who took advantage of the decline of the Han dynasty to mount a rebellion in the area of Hue.

The Cham are believed to be of Indonesian pirate stock and are noted in the earliest Chinese records for their aggressive tendencies toward banditry and rebellion. Piracy was state-sanctioned and the king shared in the booty of all raids. From the beginning Champa was a constant annoyance to the Chinese, launching numerous sorties against Tongking all through the third, fourth and fifth centuries.

In 431 the Chinese attempted reprisal and launched a sea attack on Champa but were rebuffed. In 446, T'an Ho-ch'u the Governor of Tongking sacked the capital of Champa, south of Hue, making off with a reported 100,000 pounds of gold. Thereafter, the Chinese and the Cham alternately attacked and defended until the accession of the T'ang in the early seventh century. Cham aggression then ceased for a period of some two hundred years.

The Mon Khmer absorption together with piracy and instability in Champa, the southward pressure of the Nam Viets and the demands of persistent Chinese penetration produced an economic tension for increased movement between the mouth of the Mekong and Tonle Sap. It is to about this period, in the eighth century, that I trace the "ancient" criminal tradition of southern Viet-Nam: one of endemic sea-piracy, river piracy and preying upon merchant travelers.

The Modern Traditions

There are two important areas in southern Viet Nam, each of which plays a role in the development of the Mekong Delta's criminal traditions. Indeed, modern South Viet Nam may be said to have two spiritual "centers," both deeply rooted in the geography and history of the region and both evincing fierce independence and a tradition of banditry. The first is from the Rung Sat swamps up to the Saigon Cholon area. The second is from My Tho through Can Tho up to Chau Doc.

The "Upper" and "Lower" Traditions

When I examine the Delta's modern criminal traditions I do so through the very idiosyncratic hypothesis of a "upper" tradition and a "lower" tradition, paying slight albeit geographically imprecise homage to a historical link with "upper" and "lower" Chenla. By "upper" I mentally refer to the region up river from My Tho. By "lower" I refer to the region down river from Saigon Cholon to Vung Tau.

In the latter eighth century lower Chenla was attacked by Malay pirates, who seized the islands of Pulo Condore and used them as a base for raids inland. They struck as far north as Tongking, sacked Nha Trang in Champa and sent an excursion inland to Cambodia. Their effect was profound: they are noted in all the annals of all the travelers of the era.

The Founding of Saigon

What we today know as Saigon began as a collection of villages some 80 kilometers inland from the coast, known originally as Prey Kor, or the "Land of Forests;" a refuge and hiding place from and for the pirates that harassed sea going traffic to the south and river traffic to the west. The area presented a vortex of piracy and banditry. The Malay pirate fleets operated inland from Pulo Condore. The Champa pirate fleets operated southward from below Hue. Funanese and Cham bandit gangs monopolized the overland routes.

For the first seven hundred years of its existence Prey Kor served as a market town and administrative center, consisting by about the seventh century of a citadel surrounding some fourteen villages with a fourteen kilometer wall, serviced by an extensive network of canals.

Saigon's evolution over the next seven hundred years is intimately associated with the region's lawlessness and constant turmoil and spawns what I trace as the "modern" criminal tradition, further divided into an "early modern" era and a "later modern" era.

The "Early Modern" Era

What I call the "early modern" era arises from Khmer Vietnamese and Sino Vietnamese tensions from the period beginning in the seventeenth century. Circa 1620, Vietnamese began to settle in Prey Kor, calling the area Sai Gon, or "Woods of Kapok Trees." In 1658 the provincial governor of Tran bien occupied a portion of Cambodia and captured King Ang Chan, imprisoning him for a time in Hue. Returned to the throne after paying homage as a vassal, Ang Chan was usurped by his two brothers who ejected the Vietnamese back across the border and ruled the throne jointly. In 1673 a succession dispute provided the Vietnamese with an opportunity for adroit statesmanship, installing two tributary rulers at Udong and Saigon, the latter area consisting at the time of only about 40,000 families.

The King of Saigon and Ming Partisans

In 1679, Ang Non, the king of Saigon, made an unsuccessful attempt to gain the Cambodian throne but was defeated. Ang Non fled to Annam, meeting a large fleet of junks at Tourane carrying 3,000 Chinese fugitives; partisans of the defeated Mings under the command of two officers, Yang and Ch'en. Ang Non invited the Chinese back to the Saigon area, where Ch'en and his men settled at Bien Hoa and established an agricultural center. Yang and his men settled in My Tho and established themselves as river pirates.

In 1682 Ang Non enlisted Yang's pirate gangs for a second try at Cambodia but was again defeated. Returning to Saigon, he found himself unable to control Yang's pirates and was forced to enlist the aid of Nguyen forces. The Vietnamese defeated the pirate gangs and killed Yang, installing Ch'en from Bien Hoa as the overlord of Yang's remnant forces and forcing Ang Non to admit Nguyen supremacy.

This exercise marked the passage of the lower Chenla into Vietnamese domination. When Ang Non died his son Ang Em lost Saigon to a Vietnamese governor. A small citadel was built inside the larger citadel and named Gia Dinh. In 1790, after Gia Dinh was sacked during the Tay Son rebellion, an octagon shaped fort was built inside Gia Dinh with walls twelve feet high and seven feet thick. It was destroyed in the 1830s and another, smaller fort was erected in its place. This fort remained intact until breached with explosives by the French on February 17, 1859. In February, 1861 they changed the name of Gia Dinh to Saigon and opened the port to international trade.

The Founding of Faifo and the Origins of Cholon

The involvement of renegade Chinese forms a persistent theme. From the time of the Western Han dynasty China regularly deported criminals to the south and from the ninth century onward, Indochina became a common place of refuge for the supporters of fallen dynasties and Chinese victims of piracy.

In the later sixteenth century the King of Cochin China gave permission to the Chinese to build an entrepot, named Faifo, in which to hold a trade fair. By 1768 Faifo had grown to some 6,000 Chinese merchants. In 1680, as we have seen, Ming partisans under Yang and Ch'en arrived en masse in Cochin China. In about 1778, the descendants of the Ch'en faction at Bien Hoa were ordered by the Court of Hue to a group of villages some five miles from Saigon in order to escape the Tay Son rebellion. The Chinese called this new area "Taignon" or "Tingan." The French first note it (circa 1795) as the "Chinese Bazaar." In 1782 Taignon was sacked and burned by the Tay Son and some 11,000 Chinese were killed. It recovered after Emperor Gia Long's suppression of the revolt and was named Cholon ("Great Market") by Le Van Duyet circa 1801.

The "Later Modern" Era

As Saigon grew in stability from the seventeenth century onward and as Chinese settlement increased in the area of Cholon from the eighteenth century, the pirate and bandit gangs that traditionally annoyed the region gradually moved south by south east to the marshes and canals. Further to the south east they inhabited an area named Rung Sat, or the "Jungle of Killers," in observation of the temperament of the area's traditional residents.

Arrival of the French

In February, 1859 a further dynamic was introduced when Saigon fell to the Franco Spanish expedition. By the treaty of June 5, 1862 Emperor Tu Duc ceded Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh and My Tho to the French and in 1867, the Vietnamese relinquished Vinh Long, Chau Doc and Ha Tien. Cambodia accepted French protection in 1863 and by 1884 the area came under full French administration.

Early French colonialism provided a twofold influence on crime in the region. As the French gradually suppressed major coastal piracy, the Rung Sat bandits turned their attention inland and began small-scale extortion of local river traffic. They also began making forays into Cholon to kidnap, rob or shake-down Chinese merchants.

The Triads and Vietnamese Secret Societies

In addition to providing targets of opportunity for indigenous Vietnamese swamp bandits, Chinese settlement also provided the Mekong Delta's first exposure to the Triads; exposure which arguably dates to the very foundation of the Triads that accompany the defeat of the Ming. These in turn formed outlinks to Vietnamese secret societies and, following French arrival, anti colonial movements, which by the 1900s came to resemble the Chinese models both in spirit and form. Among the noted Vietnamese "Triads" of the period are the Nghia Hoa (believed by some scholars to be an off shoot of the Boxers), the Thien Dia Hoi, or "Heaven and Earth Association," a direct Vietnamese equivalent of the Chinese Triad; the Luong Huu Hoi, or "Association of Friends;" the Nhon Hoa Duong, or "Virtue and Equity Association," and the Phat Te, or "Distribution of Aid Society."

The Binh Xuyen: A Prototypical Cochinchinese Criminal Organization

The southern Vietnamese operational environment of the 1920s and 1930s featured a criminal underworld based in and around the marshy lowlands southeast of Cholon. As we have now painfully learned, this area was traditionally infested with river pirates, bandits and assassins who could trace an uncertain heritage to the practical dawn of southern Viet Nam. Their place of refuge was the Rung Sat or aforementioned "Jungle of Killers" region, from which they launched their sorties. Here gangs and criminal families held absolute sway and formed the foundation of southern Viet Nam's modern underworld, forging links through intermarriage, criminal association and anti French activities with Chinese Triads and Vietnamese secret societies.

Several notable gangs and criminal families were located in the region of Binh Xuyen hamlet, to the south of Cholon. In the early 1920s these personalities, together with escaped contract laborers from the rubber plantations on the Rung Sat's northern fringe and Cholon street thugs, formed a loose coalition some two to three hundred strong. These forces ultimately came under the patronage of a powerful underworld figure named Duong Van Duong, also known as Ba Duong or Bach Ba (lit. "Uncle Three') who made his home in Binh Xuyen. Thus was the "Binh Xuyen" criminal collective born.

The Binh Xuyen are occasionally if imprecisely referred to as the "Vietnamese Mafia;" a description with which I can both agree and disagree depending on context. One student of the era has described them thus:

"Armed with old rifles, clubs, and knives, and schooled in Sino Vietnamese boxing, they extorted protection money from the sampans and junks that traveled the canals on their way to the Cholon docks. Occasionally they sortied into Cholon to kidnap, rob, or shake down a wealthy Chinese merchant. If too sorely pressed by the police or the colonial militia, they could retreat through the streams and canals south of Saigon deep into the impenetrable Rung Sat Swamp at the mouth of the Saigon River, where their reputations as popular heroes among the inhabitants, as well as the maze of mangrove swamps, rendered them invulnerable to capture."

In the late 1920s or early 1930s a young street hoodlum from the outskirts of Cholon named Le Van Vien ("Bay" Vien) entered the Binh Xuyen milieu and gradually came to prominence under Ba Duong's influence. Hunted by the French in the 1930s and 1940s, Bay Vien and a number of his cohorts were eventually captured and sentenced to confinement in the penal colony on Con Son Island. Ba Duong, meanwhile, had become a labor broker for the Japanese and entered into a relationship with the Japanese secret service's southern Vietnamese rezident Matsushita Mitsuhiro; a pivotal clandestine operator who performed under industrial cover as the director of Dainan Koosi, and was controlled by the Japanese Consul General in Hanoi, Yoshio Minoda.

Matsushita arranged for the kempeitai to free disparate Binh Xuyen personalities and component gangs from Con Son in 1941. Thereafter, under Japanese patronage the Binh Xuyen rapidly grew both in organization and influence.

Bay Vien escaped Con Son in early 1945 and returned to Saigon where he engaged in insurgent politics in collusion with Ba Duong and the Japanese. On March 9, 1945 the Japanese staged a coup against the Vichy French administration, jailing all French police. The Binh Xuyen were given amnesty and Bay Vien was installed as a police official by the newly established government.

In August 1945 the Viet Minh's chief of Cochin China, Tran Van Giau, formed an alliance with Bay Vien and Ba Duong against the French. When the Viet Minh called a mass demonstration on August 25, 1945:

"...fifteen well armed, bare chested bandits carrying a large banner declaring 'Binh Xuyen Assassination Committee' joined the tens of thousands of demonstrators who marched jubilantly through downtown Saigon for over nine hours."

Following the British supported French counter coup in September, 1945 the Viet Minh withdrew from Saigon, leaving Bay Vien as military commander of Saigon Cholon with a force of a hundred men. Bay Vien promptly formed an alliance with Lai Van Sang's two thousand man student group, the Avant-Garde Youth. Together with a number of Japanese deserters, they engaged the French. By the end of October, they were pushed back to the Rung Sat in a waterborne retrograde action which displayed as a key element the deployment of some 250 stay-behind agents.

The Binh Xuyen stay behind agents promptly engaged in a ruthless campaign of terror and extortion. A constant influx of men, money and materiel quickly established the Binh Xuyen as a well-armed, disciplined force of approximately 10,000 men.

A dispute arose between Ba Duong and the Viet Minh in January 1946 and in February 1946 Ba Duong was killed in strafing raid by French aircraft. Sensing a shift in the political tide, Bay Vien siezed the opportunity to consolidate his hold on the Binh Xuyen and achieve dominance. Thus, in the wake of Ba Duong's death, Bay Vien began secret negotiations with the French Deuxieme Bureau for exclusive rights to territory in Saigon, ultimately leading to a March, 1948 agreement with Savani which was formalized on June 16, 1948. The French government announced that it "...had decided to confide the police and maintenance of order to the Binh Xuyen troops in a zone where they are used to operating." Thereafter the French turned over Saigon block-by-block and by April 1954, Lai Van Sang was director-general of police and the Binh Xuyen controlled not only the Saigon-Cholon capital region but a sixty-mile strip between Saigon and Vung Tau, exercising full political and economic control. United States observers of the process laconically refer to the Binh Xuyen in this era as a:

"...political and racketeering organization which had agreed to carry out police functions [for the Government of Viet-Nam] in return for a monopoly on gambling, opium traffic and prostitution in the metropolitan areas."

Thus did the fox guard the hen-house and thus did Viet-Nam's prototypical criminal syndicate gain control of the southern Vietnamese underworld in its entirety, until the United States precipitated battle of April 28 to May 3, 1955 when they were forced back to the Rung Sat and President Ngo Dinh Diem gained control of Saigon. Bay Vien fled to exile in France and the organization fragmented, again resuming its clandestine form.

Part Two: The Police In Viet-Nam

As a corrective to the absolute nonsense that afflicts American police training literature, we now offer the following capsule history of the police in Viet Nam during the period 1875 to1975. This history is primarily based on sources generated by the Michigan State University Viet Nam Advisory Team, the U.S. Agency for International Development's Public Safety Division, and unsystematic interviews with former Vietnamese police officials and their advisors.

The Vietnamese Surete

The Vietnamese Surete, its first arguably "modern" police force, was created by the French in about 1875. The Surete was administered by French colonials, who utilized Vietnamese and Indians as auxiliaries. Originally, the Surete was headquartered in Hanoi and exercised control over the five regions of French Indochina: Tonkin, Annam, Cochin China, Cambodia and Laos. Each section of the French union was headed by a chief of police who was responsible both to the director general of the Surete in Hanoi and the colonial governor in each section. The total strength of the Surete during the period from roughly 1875 to the close of World War I was about 600 men. Offices were maintained in fifteen cities, each staffed by a French inspector and about twenty Vietnamese. The principal criminal activity with which the Surete was concerned was river piracy. Routine field trips were made by steam-driven launches once or twice each month.

During the period 1918 to 1939 the total strength of the Surete was increased from 600 to about 5,000, chiefly to cope with Vietnamese nationalistic political activity. Better training programs were instituted, with higher standards for French candidates. Police schools were established and it was required that all new French Surete agents complete a language course. During the same period communications were improved through road building activities and the installation of radio and telegraph services. Railways were also constructed, prisons were built, and a series of judicial districts created. Criminal courts employing French law were initiated in Saigon, Can Tho, My Tho, Hue, Tourane, Haiphong, Hanoi, Phnom Penh and Vientiane.

From 1939 to 1945 the Surete functioned more or less as a political organ. In September 1940 the Japanese invaded Tonkin and by March 1942 arrived in Saigon. The Surete was allowed to function under Vichy stewardship until March 9, 1945 when the Japanese siezed direct control. In August 1945 English troops arrived in Saigon to disarm the Japanese. During the period of change the Viet Minh siezed all police agencies, burning most Surete records while fighting a retrograde action as they were forced from Saigon. In September, 1945 the Surete was restored to French hands by English troops.

From 1945 to 1955 the Surete changed hands several times. In May 1950 it was turned over for the first time to a Vietnamese commander, Nguyen Van Day, a former judge. In 1951 General Mai Huu Xuan was placed in charge. He was replaced in March of 1952 by a former prefect, Le Quang Ho. In April 1954, control of the Surete was given to Lai Van Sang, leader of the Binh Xuyen criminal organization, who was also made a colonel in the Vietnamese army. Under Ngo Dinh Diem the Binh Xuan were suppressed in April-May 1955 and driven into exile. According to one informed source, upon departure the Binh Xuyen took most of the Surete intelligence files to hiding in France. By 1956 all Binh Xuyen command personnel had been removed, but numerous agents of influence were believed to still be in the ranks.

Post Binh Xuyen Development

American observers in Viet-Nam in the mid-1950s found five different police organizations in various stages of development and activity:

(1) The Surete, or Security Police.

(2) The Garde Civile, or Civil Guard.

(3) Municipal Police.

(4) Gendarmerie.

(5) Rural Police.

The Surete by this time was a plainclothes intelligence and internal security force under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. The Garde Civile, also under the Ministry of the Interior, was created in 1955 as a paramilitary police organization similar to the National Guard. The Municipal Police, or Saigon-Cholon Prefectoral Police was also responsible to the Ministry of the Interior, through General Nguyen Ngoc Le, Director of Security and Police Services of Viet-Nam. Its tasks were limited to providing general police services in the Saigon-Cholon area. The Gendarmerie investigated military matters and highway operations and was under the control of the Ministry of Defense. The Rural Police consisted of rudimentary Village Cooperative Guards and Village Militia, who served on a voluntary basis or in certain cases for nominal pay. Rural Police came under province control.

By 1960 it was estimated that there were some 70,000 police in Viet-Nam, operating within the five different groups. Also in that year the Garde Civile was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defense, becoming part of territorial security components known as Regional Forces. This left an almost total lack of police services in rural areas, and in consequence a Combat Police unit was formed in 1962.

Vietnamese National Police

In June 1962 President Diem issued an order which created a National Police, combining the Surete, the Saigon Cholon Prefectural Police, portions of the Gendarmerie, the Combat Police and various provincial forces into one unified command. In later developments a Combined Telecommunications Directorate and Directorate of Corrections was formed. In 1965 Field Police were created from remnants of the Combat Police and a Marine Police unit was made operational.

In the post-1962 era the National Police had three principal areas of responsibility:

(1) Provide for the protection of life, property, maintenance of public peace and order, and regulation of social conduct and events as prescribed by law.

(2) Execute judicial directives of courts and insure compliance with various executive, administrative and regulatory laws and orders.

(3) Maintain internal security through apprehension of subversive and insurgent activists.

To carry out these responsibilities, operational control was invested in a decentralized series of commands from the regional through the provincial, district, and village levels of government, and a number of subordinate programs were established. Among these were:

(1) Regular police, assigned to regular police duties.

(2) Field police, with light military combat capabilities, specializing in riot control and combat engagement with armed insurgents.

(3) Marine police, responsible for waterborne law enforcement on inland waterways.

(4) Judicial police, serving as officers of the court to search, seize, arrest and investigate in assistance to magistrates.

(5) Special (intelligence) police, involved in intelligence, counterintelligence and counterinsurgency support.

By early 1973 the National Police reached its highest manpower level of 120,668, approximately 3,000 to 5,000 of which were women. Adjustments to the National Police administration were made through the early 1970s which cast the force in a more military role, to the point where by 1975 the force operated much in the manner of a military command.

Viet Nam's Criminal Justice System

South Vietnamese criminal courts were made up of three magistrates, operating on the model provided by French jurisprudence. One magistrate would oversee the investigation conducted by the National Police Judicial Service (NPJS) and finalize the case for court presentation. The second would act as a prosecuting attorney. The third would trie the case and render a verdict or judgement.

There were five levels to the hierarchy of of the Vietnamese court system:

(1) The Cour de Cassation

(2) Courts of Appeal

(3) Courts of First Instance

(4) Courts of Peace With Extended Jurisdiction

(5) Courts of Peace (Justice of the Peace)

There were also assorted tribunals, hearing rent matters, juvenile matters, labor disputes, military matters and pension issues.

There were two Cours de Cassation, sitting in Saigon and Hue, hearing the highest criminal appeals. Three judges and two citizen assessors heard felony appeals.

The Courts of First Instance, of which there were nine in 1967, consisted of a presiding judge, a prosecutor, an examining magistrate and a clerk. They heard all criminal cases and could rehear cases from Courts of Peace With Extended Jurisdiction and Courts of Peace.

There were approximately twenty Courts of Peace With Extended Jurisdiction and they had jurisdiction over all misdemeanors and felonies with the exception of "serious" felonies. They consisted of a judge and clerk. In criminal cases two assistant judges would be added but no prosecutor would be present.

The Courts of Peace consisted of a justice of the peace and a clerk. Approximately ninety of these courts existed, hearing petty criminal offenses, resolving disputes and investigating serious criminal offense.

On October 17, 1968 a Vietnamese Supreme Court came into being, with powers beyond the Cours de Cassation, and thereafter the Cours de Cassation were suspended. The Supreme Court could hear pleas at any stage of a case that raised the constitutionality of law, decrees or administrative ruling.

Regrettably, the ubiquitous "Mr. Green" was a frequent habitue of the Vietnamese court system and many a proceeding was decided on his counsel. Justice may not have been blind in Viet-Nam but it was certainly practical.

Preface to Original Edition

Since 1982 I have been lecturing on the subject of Vietnamese crime and criminals at law enforcement conferences all over the United States. On numerous occasions, officers have asked questions about the historical basis for Vietnamese criminal behavior. I have also fielded many questions about the history of Viet-Nam's police forces.

I have always been reluctant to answer such questions, simply because I knew an adequate response would take far more time than is usually allotted for such exchanges. The palliative answer is that to understand the evolution of Vietnamese crime and criminals, one must know the history of twenty centuries. This history becomes a boring monologue when delivered from a lectern. It is better savored on the printed page.

This small booklet is intended as a savory for all those historically-minded officers who have questioned me through the years and to whom I have promised "something...someday." Herein I attempt the impossible: a quick, hard, summary of Vietnamese rascality through the ages, leavened with note of the modern Vietnamese police.

Many of the officers I meet are themselves occupied with writing lesson plans, lectures and monographs on the subject of Vietnamese crime. Perhaps they will find this booklet of some slight assistance in rounding out their presentations. To those who contemplate using this material in such fashion I offer the caution that one singular difference between a scholar and a plagiarist is a footnote. A footnote's chief value to the careful scholar is to shift blame to another scholar.

Note that the published edition of this work is annotated . The electronic edition is not. I do not claim to be a scholar but I will cheerfully take the blame for any glaring error of fact found here. I also suggest with equal cheer that you take the initiative to consult the works I have so carefully burglarized in preparation of this booklet. It cannot hurt you and it just might help you.

Forgive me the vanity, but the day may yet come when you are on a witness stand and some smart young defense attorney is challenging your credentials as an "expert" on the subject of Vietnamese crime. "Of course," he will ask, "you've read Cassidy on Vietnamese criminal traditions?"

"Certainly," you will confidently reply. "The man is an unmitigated ass. He claimed 'Saigon' has something to do with Kapok trees when everyone knows it is the name of a restaurant on Main Street."

This sort of exchange is a vitamin for a sleeping jury and confounds the defense. The judge will also be impressed, cut short the challenge and accept you as an expert on the spot. You will then be at liberty to spout any sort of helpful nonsense the prosecution deems necessary. "I've traced the Nguyens to the sixteenth century," you might then offer. "And they've always been up to no good."

---William L. Cassidy, A Prophet Without Honor in Garden Grove, California, December 1991.